Judicial independence is the concept that the judiciary needs to be kept away from the other branches of government. That is, courts should not be subject to improper influence from the other branches of government, or from private or partisan interests. Judicial Independence is vital and important to the idea of separation of powers.

Different countries deal with the idea of judicial independence through different means of judicial selection, or choosing judges. One way to promote judicial independence is by granting life tenure or long tenure for judges, which ideally frees them to decide cases and make rulings according to the rule of law and judicial discretion, even if those decisions are politically unpopular or opposed by powerful interests.

In many countries, the ability of the judiciary to check the legislature is enhanced by the power of judicial review. This power can be used, for example, by mandating certain action when the judiciary perceives that a branch of government is refusing to perform a constitutional duty, or by declaring laws passed by the legislature unconstitutional.

Economic basis

Constitutional economics studies such issues as the proper national wealth distribution including the government spending on the judiciary, which in many transitional and developing countries is completely controlled by the executive. The latter undermines the principle of powers' “checks and balances”, as it creates a critical financial dependence of the judiciary. It is important to distinguish between the two methods of corruption of the judiciary: the state (through budget planning and various privileges – being the most dangerous), and the private. The state corruption of the judiciary makes it almost impossible for any business to optimally facilitate the growth and development of national market economy.^[1]

Development of the concept of Judicial Independence

The judiciary has developed from a dispute-resolution mechanism, to a significant social institution with an important constitutional role which participates along with other institutions in shaping the life of its community. Social, political and economic changes, in recent times, in most countries, have confronted the courts and judges with new challenges and new problems. The centralization of the responsibility and supervision of court administration and judicial administration has raised the issue of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, and made it necessary to examine and delineate the boundaries of the scope of executive control on judges, courts and judicial administration, and court financing. It was also necessary to review the rules, traditions, and practices governing the conduct of judges off the bench, in the various areas of activities. A modern conception of judicial independence cannot be confined to the individual judge and to his substantive and personal independence, but must include collective independence of the judiciary as a whole. The concept of collective judicial independence may require a greater measure of judicial participation in the central administration of the courts including the preparation of budgets for the courts, and depending on one's view of the nature of judicial independence, the extent of judicial participation may range from consultation, joint responsibility with the executive, or exclusive judicial responsibility^[2]

The five fundamental values of the justice system

The principle of Judicial Independence is one of the core values of the justice system. These values include fairness and justice, efficiency of the judicial process, access of justice, public confidence in the courts and judicial independence^[3]

Six essential elements for constitutional protection of judicial independence

In his previous writings, Shimon Shetreet has identified six principles which he has defined as providing an essential constitutional infrastructure for the protection of judicial independence. These principles of constitutional protection of judicial independence are as follows: (i) the rule against ad hoc tribunals, (ii) the prohibition against intentionally stripping courts of their jurisdiction and diverting cases to other tribunals with a view to having those cases disposed of by tribunals that do not enjoy the same conditions of independence as the original courts, (iii) the standard-judge principle, or the ordinary-judge principle, which requires that judges be selected to hear cases by a predetermined internal plan or assignment schedule prior to the commencement of the case, (iv) the requirement of post-decisional independence of the judgment and its respect by the other branches of the government; (v) that judges must not be part of the administrative arm of the executive branch; rather, they should be viewed as independent constitutional or statutory officers of the state, and completely separate from the civil service, and (vi) changes in the terms of judicial office should not be applied to present judges unless such changes serve to improve the terms of judicial service.^[4]

The three phases of the normative cycle of shaping judicial independence

It has been suggested^[5] that there is a cycle of national law impacting international law, and international law subsequently impacting national law. This occurs in three phases: the first phase is characterized by the domestic development of the concept of judicial independence, the second by the seeping of this concept into the international scene, and the third by the re-domestication of newly reformulated international principles of judicial independence, with significant and dramatic results. There cannot be a more instructive illustration of this cycle of impacting and reimpacting than that of the UK. The first phase occurred in England with the original conception of judicial independence in the Act of Settlement in 1701.^[6] The second phase was evident when England’s concepts regarding judicial independence first entered the international scene, and from there moved into the domestic arenas of other countries; for instance, England served as the theoretical model for Montesquieu’s separation of powers doctrine^[7] and the Founding Fathers of the US Constitution used England as their dominant model in formulating the Constitution’s Article III, which is the foundation of American judicial independence.^[8] Other common law countries, including Canada, Australia, and India, also adopted the British model of judicial independence.^[9] In recent decades the third phase of judicial independence has come to play in the UK,^[10] as it has been significantly influenced by judicial independence principles developed by international human rights constitutional documents. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR[JPJ1] ”) has had a significant impact on the conceptual analysis of judicial independence in England and Scotland. This process began in the 1990s with the ECtHR hearing UK cases, and later this process found its dramatic expression in the application of the ECHR in the British Human Rights Act, which came into force in 2000.^[11] Where the British national law previously impacted the international law of judicial independence, the British Constitutional Reform Act of 2005^[12] signaled a shift, with international law now also impacting British domestic law. The Constitutional Reform Act dramatically reformed government control over the administration of justice in England and Wales  ; importantly, it discontinued the aberrant position of the Lord Chancellor, one of the country’s oldest constitutional offices, who was entrusted with a combination of legislative, executive, and judicial capacities.^[13] The Lord Chancellor served as speaker of the Upper House of Parliament, the House of Lords; as a member of the executive branch and member of the senior cabinet; and as the head of the judiciary. Historically, the appellate function had a connection with the executive branch due to the types of cases typically heard – impeachment and the hearing of felony charges against peers.^[14] The Constitutional Reform Act established new lines of demarcation between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary, transferring all the judicial functions to the judiciary and entrusting the Lord Chancellor only with what are considered administrative and executive matters. In addition, the Constitutional Reform Act replaced the Lord Chancellor by the Lord Chief Justice as head of the judiciary, separated the judicial Appellate Committee of the House of Lords from the legislative parliament, reforming it as the Supreme Court, and creating a Judicial Appointments Commission.^[15] The creation of the Supreme Court was important, for it finally separated the highest court of appeal from the House of Lords.^[16] Thus, the UK, where the first phase of judicial independence began over three hundred years ago, illustrates vividly the mutual impacts of national and international law and jurisprudence in the area of judicial independence. It demonstrates a cycle of mutual normative impacts and cross-conceptual fertilizations. In this process, concepts and ideas have become enriched as they have been implemented in successive judicial and political systems, as each system has enhanced and deepened the concepts and ideas it actualized. In addition to the UK’s instructive illustration, similar developments of conceptual cross-fertilization can be seen internationally—in EU law,^[17] in civil law countries such as Austria, and in other common law jurisdictions including Canada.^[18]

The significance of maintaining culture of judicial independence

Judicial independence is a significant component of governmental culture in every country. It is shaped by the relations between the branches of government, and is one of the basic values which lie at the foundation of the administration of justice. Judicial independence must be supported by the political climate and social consensus. The political leadership and the professional and legal elite must work together to develop a culture of judicial independence along several very significant guidelines and levels. They must do this in a long and gradual process. This chapter offers a detailed analysis of the foundations and a comprehensive examination of the levels of the culture of judicial independence, and the central issues which the legal and professional elite and the political leadership should consider in the process of building a culture of judicial independence. The culture of judicial independence is created by five important and essential aspects: creating institutional structures, establishing constitutional infrastructure, introducing legislative provisions and constitutional safeguards, creating adjudicative arrangements and jurisprudence, and maintaining ethical traditions and a code of judicial conduct. The institutional structures regulate the matters relative to the status of the judges and the jurisdiction of the courts. The constitutional infrastructure embodies in the constitution the main provisions of the protection of the judiciary. The legislative provisions offer detailed regulations of the basic constitutional principles. The courts add to the constitutional infrastructure and the legislative provisions complimentary interpretations and jurisprudence on different aspects of the conduct of judges and the operation of courts. The ethical traditions and code of judicial conduct cover the judge’s official and non-official spheres of activities, and shield the judge's substantive independence from dependencies, associations, and even less intensive involvements which might cast doubts on judicial neutrality. International law plays a significant role in creating the culture of judicial independence in domestic law. In this chapter the case of England is presented in order to illustrate the impact of international law on national law as well as to illustrate the earlier impact of the English law and constitutional principles of judicial independence on the U.S. Constitution and other legal cultures in developing judicial independence. I have elsewhere classified this process as the normative cycle of international and national law in the area of judicial independence. International law influences domestic law by virtue of international human rights treaties which provide for principles of fair procedures and for the right to be tried before an impartial and independent tribunal. In addition to international treaties, there are international standards which non-governmental and academic study groups have developed. One such recent project is the Mt. Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence 2008 (“Mt. Scopus Standards”) adopted by the International Association of judicial independence and World Peace.^[19][20]

The main provisions of the Mt. Scopus Standards

1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

1.1. An independent and impartial judiciary is an institution of the highest value in every society and an essential pillar of liberty and the rule of law.

1.2. The objectives and functions of the judiciary shall include:

1.2.1.1. To resolve disputes and to administer the law impartially between persons and between persons and public authorities;

1.2.1.2. To promote, within the proper limits of the judicial function, the observance and the attainment of human rights; and

1.2.1.3. To ensure that all people are able to live securely under the rule of law.

2. THE JUDICIARY AND THE EXECUTIVE

2.1. The Judiciary as a whole shall be independent.

2.2. Each judge shall enjoy both personal independence and substantive independence:

2.2.1. Personal independence means that the terms and conditions of judicial service are adequately secured by law so as to ensure that individual judges are not subject to executive control; and

2.2.2. Substantive independence means that in the discharge of his judicial function, a judge is subject to nothing but the law and the commands of his conscience.

2.3. The Judiciary as a whole shall enjoy collective independence and autonomy vis-à-vis the Executive.

2.4. Judicial appointments and promotions by the Executive are not inconsistent with judicial independence as long as they are in accordance with Principles 4.

2.5. No executive decree shall reverse specific court decisions, or change the composition of the court in order to affect its decision-making.

2.6. The Executive may only participate in the discipline of judges by referring complaints against judges, or by the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, but not by the adjudication of such matters.

2.7. The power to discipline or remove a judge must be vested in an institution which is independent of the Executive.

2.8. The power of removal of a judge shall preferably be vested in a judicial tribunal.

2.9. The Executive shall not have control over judicial functions.

2.10. Rules of procedure and practice shall be made by legislation or by the Judiciary in cooperation with the legal profession, subject to parliamentary approval.

2.11. The state shall have a duty to provide for the execution of judgments of the Court. The Judiciary shall exercise supervision over the execution process.

2.12. Judicial matters are exclusively within the responsibility of the Judiciary, both in central judicial administration and in court level judicial administration.

2.13. The central responsibility for judicial administration shall preferably be vested in the Judiciary or jointly in the Judiciary and the Executive.

2.14. The principle of democratic accountability should be respected and therefore it is legitimate for the legislature to play a role in judicial appointments and central administration of justice provided that due consideration is given to the principle of judicial independence.

2.15. The process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to the principle of fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects.

2.15.1. Taking into consideration the principle of fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects, in the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, gender, language, religion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, subject however to citizenship requirements. .

2.16. Candidates for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability, well- trained in the law. They shall have equality of access to judicial office.

2.17. It is the duty of the state to provide adequate financial resources to allow for the due administration of justice.

2.18. Division of work among judges should ordinarily be done under a predetermined plan, which can be changed in certain clearly defined circumstances.

2.18.1. In countries where the power of division of judicial work is vested in the chief justice, it is not considered inconsistent with judicial independence to accord to the chief justice the power to change the predetermined plan for sound reasons, preferably in consultation with the senior judges when practicable.

2.18.2. Subject to 2.18.1, the exclusive responsibility for case assignment should be vested in a responsible judge, preferably the President of the Court.

2.19. The power to transfer a judge from one court to another shall be vested in a judicial authority according to grounds provided by law and preferably shall be subject to the judge’s consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld.

2.20. Judicial salaries and pensions shall be adequate at all times, fixed by law, and should be periodically reviewed independently of Executive control

2.21. The position of the judges, their independence, their security of tenure, and their adequate remuneration shall be entrenched constitutionally or secured by law.

2.22. Judicial salaries, pensions, and benefits cannot be decreased during judges’ service except as a coherent part of an overall public economic measure.

2.23. The Ministers of the government shall not exercise any form of pressure on judges, whether overt or covert, and shall not make statements which adversely affect the independence of individual judges, or of the Judiciary as a whole.

2.24. The power of pardon shall be exercised cautiously so as to avoid its use as an interference with judicial decision.

2.25. The Executive shall refrain from any act or omission which pre-empts the judicial resolution of a dispute, or frustrates the proper execution of a court judgment.

2.26. The Executive shall not have the power to close down, or suspend, or delay, the operation of the court system at any level.

3. THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGISLATURE

3.1. The Legislature shall not pass legislation which reverses specific court decisions.

3.2. Legislation introducing changes in the terms and conditions of judicial service shall not be applied to judges holding office at the time of passing the legislation unless the changes improve the terms of service and are generally applied.

3.3. In case of legislation reorganising or abolishing courts, judges serving in these courts shall not be affected, except for their transfer to another court of the same or materially comparable status.

3.4. Everyone shall have the right to be tried expeditiously by the established ordinary courts or judicial tribunals under law, subject to review by the courts.

3.5. Part-time judges should be appointed only with proper safeguards secured by law.

3.6. The Legislature may be vested with the powers of removal of judges, upon a recommendation of a judicial commission or pursuant to constitutional provisions or validly enacted legislation.^[21]

The New Delhi Code of Minimum Standards of judicial independence

An earlier project was the new Delhi Code of minimum Standards of judicial Independence adopted in cooperation with The International Bar Association in 1982

A) Personal and Substantive Independence The New Delhi standards are based on the conception that the independence of the judiciary carries two meanings: the independence of the individual judges, and the independence of the judiciary as a body. The independence of the individual judge comprises two essential elements: the substantive independence and the personal independence. Substantive independence means that in the making of judicial decision and exercising other official duties, individual judges are subject to no other authority but the law.

Personal independence means that the judicial terms of office and tenure are adequately secured. Personal independence is secured by judicial appointment during good behaviour terminated at retirement age, and by safeguarding judicial remuneration. Thus, executive control over terms of service of the judges, such as remuneration, pensions, or travel allowances, is inconsistent with the concept of judicial independence. Still much less acceptable is any executive control over case assignment, court scheduling, or moving judges from one court to another or from one locality to another.2

B) Judicial Conduct Independence of the judiciary implies not only that a judge should be free from executive or legislative encroachment and from political pressures and entanglements, but also that he should be removed from financial or business entanglement likely to affect, or rather to seem to affect, him in the exercise of his judicial functions. The duties of the judge as to the standards of his conduct are detailed in Standards 36-45.3 The Standards are aimed at removing judges from political and business entanglements and from controversies or improprieties. As to judges and the Press, New Delhi Standards 33-35 allow for interviews to the Press, subject to the duty to preserve judicial dignity.

C) Collective Independence A modern conception of judicial independence cannot be confined to the individual judge and to his substantive and personal independence, but must include collective independence of the judiciary as a whole.4 The concept of collective judicial independence requires a greater measure of judicial participation in the central administration of the courts, including the preparation of budgets for the courts. New Delhi Standard 9 calls for exclusive judicial responsibility for judicial administration on the central level, or at least joint responsibility with the Executive. The Montreal Declaration provides that the main responsibility for court administration shall vest in the judiciary.5

The conception of personal independence and substantive independence of the individual judges is universally recognized by law and by legal writers. However, the concept of collective independence of the judiciary which this writer has advocated in recent years6 is not yet well established.

The significance of the New Delhi Standards, and following them, the Montreal Declaration, was the recognition of the concept of collective independence of the judiciary, which calls for greater administrative independence of the judiciary in matters of central court administration including the participation in the formulation of the courts' budgets.7 One of the important achievements of the New Delhi Standards and the Montreal Declaration was the emphasis on this most significant conceptual aspect of the principle of judicial independence in modern society.

D) Internal Independence Another aspect of judicial independence which has not attracted sufficient attention is the internal independence of the judiciary. That is the independence of a judge from his judicial superiors and colleagues. This also transcends both the substantive and personal independence of the judge vis-a-vis his colleagues and superiors. New Delhi Standard 46 stresses this point; and, in the commentary for this New Delhi Standard, we recommend that separate and dissenting opinions be permissible in order to encourage internal judicial independence.8 In this context it should be noted that New Delhi Standard 11 calls for a division of work among judges according to a pre¬determined plan, to be conducted by the head of the Court according to clearly defined rules. This Standard generally accepts the civil law concept of natural judge. (Gesetzlicher Richter).

E) Judges and the Executive The protection of judicial terms of service from Executive interference is attained by the Standards in many ways. Executive participation in disciplinary procedures for judges is limited to referring or initiating complaints. The Executive is excluded from adjudication of such complaints. (Standard 4). The New Delhi Standards call for judicial removal by a judicial tribunal or by the legislation upon a recommendation of a judicial tribunal.9

As to judicial appointments, New Delhi Standard 3 calls for appointment by a predominantly judicial body, but allows the continuation of judicial appointment by non-judicial bodies, in countries, where by long historic tradition, such a practice operates satisfactorily. 10 The New Delhi Standards exclude the Executive from involvement in judicial matters and matters concerning judges (Standard 5), and vest the judiciary with the responsibility for such, matters (Standard 801 Thus the power to transfer a judge should be vested in a judicial authority (Standard 12),12 and the execution process is put under judicial supervision (Standard 7).13

The Standards call for security of judicial remuneration and provision of adequate judicial salaries by regular and timely pay increases (Standard 14).14 They prohibit a decrease of judicial salaries which is not part of an overall economic measure (Standard 15).15 One of the most pressing problems of the Court system in recent times is the limited resource. Standard 13 responds to this issue and imposes on the relevant government a duty, to adequately finance the Court Services.16

The Standards impose on ministers a duty to refrain from adverse statements on judges (Standard 16), and call for cautious exercise of the power of pardon (Standard 1707

Against the background of incidents of closing down courts, and frustrating of judicial decisions by Executive action, Standard 18 prohibits Executive preemption or frustration of judicial resolution of cases,18 and provides that the Executive shall not have the power to close down or suspend the operation of the court system at any level. 19

F) Security of Judicial Tenure Probationary appointments are considered inconsistent with judicial independence, except for legal systems where judges are appointed without prior practical experience (Standard 23): Temporary appointments of judges are also rejected by the Standards, except where they exist by long historic, democratic tradition.20 Part-time judges can only be appointed, subject to proper safeguards. Detailed principles are set down in Standards 27-32 concerning the procedure and the grounds for judicial discipline and removal.21 The Standards call for a judicial procedure and a judicial tribunal for removal or discipline of judges. In cases of Legislative removal, the Standards call for a recommendation by a judicial tribunal.

G) The Legislature and Judges The Standards recognise the problems emanating from adverse Legislative interference with judicial terms of office and judicial adjudication. Standard 19 prohibits retroactive legislative reversal of specific decisions.22 Standard 20 qualifies the application of legislation, changing terms of judicial office or abolishing courts to future holders of office,23 and not to present judges serving at the time of the passage of the legislation.24

H) Standards of Judicial Selection Standard 26 provides that selection of judges should be based on merit. I call your attention to the commentary on this standard, where it is stated that the selection process of judges should take into account the fair representation on the bench of the various social classes, ethnic groups, geographical regions and ideological inclinations, so as to insure equality of access to judicial office, and a broad spectrum of community attitudes and feelings among the persons holding judicial office. This principle is expressly provided in the Montreal Declaration which requires that "the process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to ensuring a fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects" (Art. 2.13).

Conclusion In conclusion, it is important to stress that the confirmation of the Jerusalem Approved Standards in New Delhi by the IBA Convention was a significant step in the improvement of the administration of justice and the better protection of human rights in our world today, and so was the confirmation of the Universal Declaration of the Independence of Justice.^[22]

Canada

Canada has a level of judicial independence entrenched in its Constitution, awarding superior court justices various guarantees to independence under sections 96 to 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867. These include rights to tenure (although the Constitution has since been amended to introduce mandatory retirement at age 75) and the right to a salary determined by the Parliament of Canada (as opposed to the executive). In 1982 a measure of judicial independence was extended to inferior courts specializing in criminal law (but not civil law) by section 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, although in the 1986 case Valente v. The Queen it was found these rights are limited. They do, however, involve tenure, financial security and some administrative control.

The year 1997 saw a major shift towards judicial independence, as the Supreme Court of Canada in the Provincial Judges Reference found an unwritten constitutional norm guaranteeing judicial independence to all judges, including civil law inferior court judges. The unwritten norm is said to be implied by the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. Consequently, judicial compensation committees such as the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission now recommend judicial salaries in Canada. There are two types of judicial independence: institutional independence and decisional independence. Institutional independence means the judicial branch is independent from the executive and legislative branches. Decisional independence is the idea that judges should be able to decide cases solely based on the law and facts, without letting the media, politics or other concerns sway their decisions, and without fearing penalty in their careers for their decisions.

Hong Kong

In Hong Kong, independence of the judiciary has been the tradition since the territory became a British crown colony in 1842. After the 1997 transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, an international treaty registered with the United Nations, independence of the judiciary, along with continuation of English common law, has been enshrined in the territory's constitutional document, the Basic Law.^[23][24]

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom and its predecessor states, judicial independence emerged slowly. Under the Norman monarchy of the Kingdom of England, the king and his Curia Regis held judicial power. Later, however, more courts were created and a judicial profession grew. In the fifteenth century, the king's role in this feature of government thus became small.^[25] Nevertheless, kings could still influence courts and dismiss judges. The Stuart dynasty used this power frequently in order to overpower Parliament. After the Stuarts were removed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, some advocated guarding against royal manipulation of the judiciary. King William III finally approved the Act of Settlement 1701, which established tenure for judges unless Parliament removed them.^[26]

Under the unwritten British Constitution, there are two important conventions which help to preserve judicial independence. The first is that Parliament does not comment on the cases which are before the court. The second is the principle of parliamentary privilege: That Members of Parliament are protected from prosecution in certain circumstances by the courts.

In modern times, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.3. In order to try to promote the independence of the judiciary, the selection process is designed to minimize political interference. The process focuses on senior members of the judiciary rather than on politicians. Part 2 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 aims to increase diversity among the judiciary.

The pay of judges is determined by an independent pay review body. It will make recommendations to the government having taken evidence from a variety of sources. The government accepts these recommendations and will traditionally implement them fully. As long as judges hold their positions in "good order," they remain in post until they wish to retire or until they reach the mandatory retirement age of 70.

As of March 2008, the legal profession is self-regulating; it is responsible for implementing and enforcing its own professional standards and disciplining its own members. In this case, the bodies are the Bar Council and the Law Society. However, this self-regulation will come to an end when those bodies themselves come under the regulation of the Legal Standards Board, composed of non-lawyers, under the Legal Services Act 2007.

United States

Federal courts

Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the federal courts as part of the federal government.

The Constitution provides that federal judges, including judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, are appointed by the President "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Once appointed, federal judges:

...both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Federal judges vacate office only upon death, resignation, or impeachment and removal from office by Congress; only 13 federal judges have ever been impeached. The phrase "during good behavior" predates the Declaration of Independence. John Adams equated it with quamdiu se bene gesserint in a letter to the Boston Gazette published on 11 January 1773,^[27] a phrase that first appeared in section 3 of the Act of Settlement 1701 in England.

The President is free to appoint any person to the federal bench, yet typically he consults with the American Bar Association,whose Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary rates each nominee "Well Qualified," "Qualified" or "Not Qualified." For instance, David Souter was appointed in the Supreme Court by President George H. W. Bush in 1990 but in Bush v. Gore case in 2000 vote with minority against President George W. Bush's legal position. It was specially mentioned in the book, written in Russian and bearing Souter's name in the title.^[28] Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Yury Danilov, reviewing the book in a Moscow English-language daily, made the following remark on Souter's position in Bush v. Gore case: "In a most critical and delicate situation, David Souter had maintained the independence of his position and in this respect had become a symbol of the independence of the judiciary."^[29]

State courts

State courts deal with independence of the judiciary in many ways, and several forms of judicial selection are used for both trial courts and appellate courts (including state supreme courts), varying between states and sometimes within states. In some states, judges are elected (sometime on a partisan ballot, other times on a nonpartisan one), while in others they are appointed by the governor or state legislature.

The 2000 case of Bush v. Gore, in which a majority of the Supreme Court, including some appointees of President George H. W. Bush, overruled challenges to the election of the George W. Bush then pending in the Florida Supreme Court, whose members had all been appointed by Democratic governors, is seen by many as reinforcing the need for judicial independence, both with regard to the Florida Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court. This case has focused increased attention on judicial outcomes as opposed to the traditional focus on judicial qualifications.

See also

• Corruption
• Rule of law
• Rule According to Higher Law
• Constitutional economics
• Judiciary
• Judiciary in Russia
• Judicial reform
• Separation of powers

References

External links

• Independence of the judicial system Part I. The Independence of Judges Part II - the Prosecution Service Venice Commission, 2010